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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal Vincent Harris contends that when the 
government paid several confidential informants to gather 
information and later had those informants testify at 
Harris's criminal trial, the government violated the so-called 
"antigratuity statute," 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2). The statute 
prohibits "whoever" from giving "anything of value to any 
person, for or because of the testimony under oath .. . by 
such person as a witness upon a trial. . . ." We reject 
Harris's argument and will affirm the District Court. 
 
I 
 
The significance of the paid informants' testimony was to 
identify whether Harris, who admitted having once been a 
drug dealer, had withdrawn from his illegal activities by 
February 18, 1993, the first date the prosecution could use 
under the statute of limitations. Harris maintained that he 
had quit by then and that during the early nineties he 
became religious and devoted his time to preaching to 
youths and his former accomplices about the harmful 
effects of drugs. 
 
The informant who placed Harris's participation in the 
drug dealing closest to the time of the indictment was 
Patrick Watts. A number of months before the trial the 
government gave Watts three payments of $250, $350, and 
$1,500 to collect information about drug deals. In addition 
to these payments, Watts, who had himself previously 
engaged in drug trafficking, also received a sentence 
reduction of approximately eight years. A second witness, 
Jerome Lewis, received $20 a number of months before the 
trial for acting as a confidential informant, and had his 
sentence reduced from approximately fifteen years to five 
years. His testimony, however, was less helpful, as it placed 
Harris's most recent drug activity around 1992 to 1993. A 
third witness for the government, Ron Baxter, had his car 
seized and later returned by state authorities in the course 
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of the state's prosecution of him, but there is no evidence 
in the record that the decision to return the car was 
influenced by federal officials. Harris also argues that the 
federal government never indicted Baxter, his girlfriend, or 
sister, all of whom apparently had some involvement with 
illegal drugs. 
 
After hearing the witnesses' testimony, and having full 
knowledge of the money and other benefits those witnesses 
received, the jury convicted Harris of distributing cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and committing a related 
conspiracy offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. 
 
II 
 
We have previously held that promises of leniency do not 
violate the antigratuity statute. United States v. Hunte, 193 
F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 962 (2000). 
Thus, the sentence reductions that Watts and Lewis 
received are not prohibited by the statute. And by 
implication another type of leniency, the decision not to 
prosecute, which allegedly took place in Baxter's case, is 
also not prohibited by the statute. See, e.g. , United States 
v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 285 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 120 S.Ct. 1440 (2000). Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972) (reviewing lengthy 
history of grants of immunity to witnesses). The central 
question raised in this appeal is whether the government 
violates the statute when it pays an informant before trial 
to collect information and does so when there is some 
expectation that the informant may later testify about what 
the informant discovered. 
 
In United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 
1991), we held that there was no constitutional due process 
violation when a government informant testified at a 
criminal trial and was compensated for his participation in 
a sting operation by receiving a percentage of the assets 
forfeited by the defendant. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408 (1966) (no due process violation for 
using testimony of an informer who received some 
compensation). Under the agreement at issue in Gonzales, 
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the amount of the informant's reward depended on the 
degree of his cooperation, but the defendants did not have 
to be convicted for the informant to be paid. 927 F.2d at 
143. Nevertheless, we operated under the assumption that 
the informant "did have an interest in the result of " the 
case. Id. at 144. In finding no due process violation, we 
concluded that "[t]he method of payment is properly a 
matter for the jury to consider in weighing the credibility of 
the informant." Id. (quoting United States v. Hodge, 594 
F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 
Whether the government's use of a paid informant's 
testimony rises to the level of a constitutional violation, 
however, does not resolve whether legislation like the 
antigratuity statute prohibits the government from using 
the testimony. No such statutory issue was before the court 
in Gonzales. But regardless of the reach of Gonzales, under 
the facts of his case Harris is rowing against the tide. So far 
the three circuits that have directly addressed the issue 
have held, under a variety of circumstances, that the 
government's use of a paid informant's testimony does not 
violate the antigratuity statute. See United States v. Anty, 
203 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barnett, 197 
F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Albanese, 195 
F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 
We agree with these circuits that the government can pay 
informants to gather information and can have those 
informants testify at trial. In reaching this conclusion we 
stress, as the Fourth Circuit did, that "a defendant's right 
to be apprised of the government's compensation 
arrangement with the witness, see United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 683-84, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985), and to 
inquire about it on cross-examination, cf. Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308, 315-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (1974), must be 
vigorously protected." United States v. Anty , 203 F.3d at 
312. And of course perjury and the use of perjured 
testimony remain illegal. Barnett, 197 F.3d at 144. 
 
Our reasoning follows the rationale in Hunte: a general 
term like "whoever," as it appears in the antigratuity 
statute, excludes the United States when a contrary reading 
"would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established 
prerogative" or would "work obvious absurdity." Nardone v. 
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United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383-84, 58 S.Ct. 275 (1937). 
As the Fourth Circuit detailed, a broad array of statutes 
permit the government to pay witnesses for fees and 
expenses, including those incurred as part of the witness 
protection program. Anty, 203 F.3d at 309 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
S 1821 (per diem, mileage, and subsistence expenses for 
witnesses); Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b) (same); 18 U.S.C.S 3195 
(extradition costs); 18 U.S.C. S 3521(b) (expenses for 
witness protection program); 28 U.S.C. S 1821(b) (nominal 
witness attendance fee); Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(d) (same)). And 
the antigratuity statute itself allows the government to pay 
"witness fees provided by law." See 18 U.S.C. S 201(d). 
 
Harris could argue that since these statutes are limited 
to expenses a witness incurs in testifying on the 
government's behalf, they appear to offer insufficient 
support for any greater compensation for gathering 
evidence and testifying. But other statutes address more 
directly the circumstance raised in our case--payments to 
others for gathering information. As Anty explains, 
Congress has authorized payments for "information" and 
"services" to apprehend those who violate a number of 
criminal laws. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. S 886(a) (payments to 
individuals for drug enforcement); 26 U.S.C. S 7623 
(payments to detect and prosecute tax offenders); 19 U.S.C. 
S 1619 (payments for information in customs enforcement); 
18 U.S.C. S 3059B (rewards for assisting the Department of 
Justice); 18 U.S.C. S 3059A(a)(1) (payments for information 
in prosecution of offenses against financial institutions); 18 
U.S.C. S 3059(b) (rewards for information in apprehending 
certain fugitives); 18 U.S.C. S 1751(g) (payments for 
"information and services" about assassination, assault, or 
kidnapping of the President); 18 U.S.C. S 3056(c)(1)(D) 
(payments for assisting the Secret Service). As Anty 
reasoned, we think that Congress contemplated that the 
individuals paid under these statutes could assist both by 
gathering information and testifying about it. "In 
authorizing the payment of rewards for information, 
assistance, and services in the enforcement of criminal 
statutes, Congress surely must have contemplated 
payments to informants for assisting both in investigations 
and by testifying." 203 F.3d at 309. Adopting the rule urged 
by Harris also would seem to have the surprising 
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implication that police officers may not testify at trials, as 
the government pays the officers a salary to collect 
information and testify at trial about that information when 
necessary. 
 
This case does not require us to decide, however, whether 
the antigratuity statute allows the government to pay a 
witness solely or essentially for favorable testimony, as 
distinct from paying a witness for collecting evidence and 
testifying about what was found. In this regard we follow 
the Seventh Circuit, which has expressly reserved whether 
the antigratuity statute "would permit prosecutors to pay 
cash for favorable testimony, a practice that lacks the 
statutory and historical support of immunity and sentence 
reduction." United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 689 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1784 (1999). Existing rules of 
evidence may also speak to this circumstance. 
 
The government insists that we have effectively decided 
that it can make payments solely for favorable testimony 
because in Hunte we defined the term "whoever" in the 
antigratuity statute as not including the government. We 
disagree with the government that Hunte resolves the issue. 
In Hunte we merely held that "whoever" does not 
encompass the government when it is acting within some 
well-established authority--in that case the government's 
power to use leniency or plea agreements in exchange for 
truthful testimony. Our reasoning in this case parallels that 
logic. 
 
We find no merit in the other arguments Harris raises. 
For the foregoing reasons, the December 21, 1998 
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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